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Abstract—Active network measurements constitute an impor-
tant part in gaining a better understanding of the Internet.
Although IPv4-wide scans are now easily possible, random active
probing is infeasible in the IPv6 Internet. Therefore, we propose
a hybrid approach to generate a hitlist of IPv6 addresses for
scanning: First, we extract IPv6 addresses from passive flow
data. Second, we leverage publicly available resources such as
rDNS data to gather further IPv6 addresses. Third, we conduct
traceroute measurements from several vantage points to obtain
additional addresses. We perform multiple active measurements
on gathered IPv6 addresses and evaluate response rates over
time. We extensively compare all IPv6 address sources. In total
we found 150M unique IPv6 addresses over the course of four
weeks. Our hitlist covers 72% of announced prefixes and 84% of
Autonomous Systems. Finally, we give concrete recommendations
to maximize source efficiency for different scan types.
I. INTRODUCTION
The deployment of IPv6 is quickly gaining momentum: By
the end of 2015 native IPv6 traffic to Google surpassed 10%
[12]. To better understand the current state of the Internet,
active measurements are an important tool. Since the address
space in IPv6 is orders of magnitude larger than in IPv4
a complete scan is not feasible. Therefore smart address
selection techniques are needed to probe for potentially active
IPv6 addresses. By gathering addresses from both active and
passive measurements, this paper presents a first step into
systematic selection of IPv6 addresses for scanning. Over the
course of four weeks we gathered flow data from a major
uplink of universities and scientific institutions and sampled
flow data from a large European IXP. During this collection
process we conducted multiple active measurements to all
observed IPs. This allowed us to evaluate the passive flow data
with regards to the response rate, in addition to AS and prefix
coverage. As active sources we selected various DNS data
sets [22], [23], [24], the Alexa Top 1 Million list [2], and the
CAIDA DNS Names data set [5]. We carried out traceroutes to
all IPs collected from active sources in order to find additional
IPs pertaining to routers. Finally, we give concrete advice on
the usefulness of sources depending on scan type.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions:
(a) We extensively compare different sources for IPv6 ad-
dresses. (b) We research time stability of addresses depending
on source, observed protocol type, and scan type. (c) We give
specific advice for efficiently combining sources depending on
the intended scan type.
Highlights of our results include: (a) Uplink vantage points,
in comparison to IXPs, see much less unique IPs, more
tunneling techniques and much more DNS traffic. (b) ICMPv6
response rate is in almost all cases higher than in-protocol
response rates. This even applies for the Alexa 1M list, which
should offer a 100% response rate to HTTP queries. This
rule does not apply to IPs observed on peer-to-peer ports
(e.g. udp49001), likely due to home routers dropping ICMPv6
echo request packets. (c) Given the quick decline in re-
sponsiveness and dominance of privacy extensions, the number
of observed IPs is a pointless metric. Building on [21], we
suggest to focus on IPs observed as stable for at least a week.
(d) Passive sources provide great coverage but are difficult
to obtain and operate. As only 15% of ASes and 31% of /64
prefixes were found exclusively in passive sources, they might
be omitted where completeness is not critical.
Outline. In Section II we discuss related work and compare
it to our approach. Section III explains our method, followed
by a list of data sources and the implementation description
in Section IV. In Section V we evaluate the gathered hit lists
and synthesize those insights into specific recommendations
per scan type, concluding in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we first survey work on IPv6 deployment.
Then we present studies which focus on hitlist generation.
Finally, we review work on Internet scanning.
IPv6 Deployment and Classification. Malone in 2008 [19]
classified the Interface IDs of IPv6 addresses from server logs
and active traceroutes. He reports a majority of EUI-64 or
manually configured (“low”) addresses for server logs and
≈90% “low” addresses for traceroute respondents. Czyz et
al. in 2014 [6] globally measured IPv6 adoption, leveraging
10 global data sets such as Alexa 1M DNS lookups and
passive traffic samples. They report a traffic profile of over
95% of IPv6 traffic being user traffic (HTTP or HTTPS). In
2015, Plonka and Berger [21] released their work on IPv6
address classification based on Akamai server logs. Over the
course of one year, they recorded clients from 133 countries
and over 4,000 Autonomous Systems, which they classified
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for temporal stability and spatial density. They find only
≈ 4% of addresses to be stable for 4 days or more. They
also observe about ≈ 1% EUI-64 addresses. Of the unstable
EUI-64 addresses about 62% roamed between /64 prefixes.
CAIDA’s Archipelago project randomly probes all routed /48
or shorter prefixes in a distributed and time-spread manner
from all its monitors. We use their dataset [5] both as an input
and for evaluation purposes.
Hitlist Generation. Although some IPv6 hitlist generation
methods are publicly known (e.g., RFC 7707), this is to the
best of our knowledge the first work evaluating IPv6 hitlist
generation. However, there is a long history of work on IPv4
hitlist generation: In 2000, Govindan et al. [13] published their
work on using random informed probing to self-generate a
hitlist aimed on Internet structure discovery. In 2001, Huffaker
et al. [17] started using first hitlists generated from web server
logs and traffic traces, involving extensive manual processing.
In 2008, Sherwood et al. [26] presented a tool for probing a
fixed address per subnet in a distributed manner. Permitted by
advances in available data rate and scanning tool performance,
Fan et al. [9] in 2010 published their work on creating a
complete and stable IPv4 hitlist. For this, they repeatedly
scanned the entire IPv4 address space and singled out IP
addresses that were stable in responsiveness. They share this
list, but warn that this might introduce both systematic bias
and potential endpoint overload by several researchers probing
the same set of IP addresses repeatedly.
Summarizing, IPv4 Internet probing moved from specific
random or informed probing into a then sparsely populated
Internet to repeatedly fully probing the now densely populated
IPv4 space and recording time-stable hosts for efficient hitlists.
We believe that the IPv6 Internet will stay sparsely populated
for years to come, and hence suggest informed repeated
probing to generate a core set of stable and active addresses.
Internet scans. Internet scans have long been used by re-
searchers to derive a better understanding of network pro-
tocols. In recent years these types of scans have especially
been utilized to survey the security of network protocols.
In 2011 Holz et al. [16] studied the SSL landscape using
active and passive measurements over a period of over 1.5
years. They found that the SSL PKI was in a sorry state,
e.g. due to incorrect certification chains or invalid certification
names. In 2012 Heninger et al. [15] evaluated the crypto-
graphic security of TLS and SSH. They performed large-scale
measurements to gather TLS certificates and SSH host keys.
The authors investigated the issue of malfunctioning random
number generators resulting in predictable RSA and DSA
keys. Durumeric et al. [7] in 2013 published a long-term study
of the SSL PKI. They performed 110 Internet-wide active
measurements over a period of 14 months and found practices
that put the certification system at risk. In 2014 Gasser et al.
[10] conducted their own Internet-wide scans and confirmed
many of Heninger et al.’s findings for SSH. Furthermore, they
evaluated the phenomenon of duplicate yet strong keys.
III. APPROACH
In this section we describe our approach and give an
insight in the ethical considerations that we followed during
the measurements. Generally, we first gather IP addresses
from various sources. We then actively probe those addresses
for responsiveness of different protocols over time. From
traceroute probes, we gain additional router addresses. Finally,
we evaluate the usefulness of all sources for different scan
types.
Sources. For this work, we gathered 3 types of sources:
Passive: Collecting flow data of IPv6 Internet traffic.
Active: Obtaining static files and performing additional
steps, such as DNS resolution.
Traceroute: Conducting traceroutes, yielding router IPs.
Filtering. To probe and evaluate our hitlists, we first filter out
undesired addresses: First, we drop flows generated by our co-
located measurement machine. This avoids introducing a bias
caused by our own measurements. Second, we separate the
flows into individual addresses and remove duplicates. Third,
we filter the addresses against the daily updated fullbogon list
of TeamCymru1. Fourth, we filter out IANA special reserved
IP ranges2. Fifth, we filter out scans into our own networks.
Sixth, we whitelist the remainder against the current CAIDA’s
Prefix to AS (pfx2as) list [4] to only scan announced prefixes.
Seventh, we whitelist routes actually announced in BGP.
Finally, we remove IP addresses from blacklisted networks.
IPv6 Scanning Tool. To actively probe large amounts of IPv6
addresses, we need a tool capable of high-volume scans at
different protocols. Tools such as ping or nmap are capable
of probing IPv6 hosts, but lack performance. Recently, tools
such as masscan [14], and zmap [8] made it possible to scan
the complete IPv4 Internet in less than five minutes [1]. Since
these tools lack support for IPv6 network measurements we
decided to extend zmap to make it IPv6-capable. Specifically,
we added generic IPv6 support to zmap and furthermore ported
some probe modules to IPv6. The modified version of zmap
allows us to scan hosts for ICMPv6 (Echo Request), IPv6 TCP
SYN (any port) and IPv6 UDP (any port and payload). The
modified version is available on our website [11].
Ethical Considerations. Active network measurements can
be interpreted as an attack, resulting in investigative effort.
To minimize the intrusiveness of our active network measure-
ments we implemented several procedures:
First, our research group incorporates an internal approval
process before any measurement activities are carried out.
This process is derived from University of Twente’s process
regarding ethical permissibility of research. This approval
process, which involves multiple parties, allows us to reflect
on the potential harm induced by network measurements and
take preventive measures.
Second, we set up a website on the scanning machines which
explains our measurement activity in detail.
1https://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Bogons/fullbogons-ipv6.txt
2https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-space/ipv6-address-space.xml
TABLE I: IP address statistics for IXP and MWN.
IXP MWN
Characteristic Jul 28 - Aug 10, 2015 Sep 03 - Sep 16, 2015 Jul 28 - Aug 10, 2015 Sep 03 - Sep 16, 2015
Total IP address observations 1,606,380,271 827,195,355 1,523,891,579 2,925,494,392
Unique addresses 70,288,801 (100%) 80,121,373 (100%) 4,797,664 (100%) 5,901,149 (100%)
Removing Fullbogons -2,656 (-0.00%) -2,930 (-0.00%) -45 (-0.00%) -39 (-0.00%)
Removing IANA special -1,315,539 (-1.87%) -1,147,247 (-1.43%) -3,236,590 (-67.5%) -4,610,134 (-78.1%)
Removing pfx2as -726 (-0.00%) -844 (-0.00%) -783 (-0.02%) -863 (-0.01%)
Final 68,969,997 (98.1%) 78,970,545 (-98.6%) 1,560,343 (32.5%) 1,290,242 (21.9%)
Final, average per day: 4,926,428 5,640,753 111,453 92,160
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Fig. 1: IP, AS and prefix runup over two weeks.
Third, we maintain a blacklist of hosts and networks which
will not be scanned in any of our measurements. Throughout
the experiment, we received one e-mail out of curiosity and
another one asking to be blacklisted. We complied with the
blacklisting request and did not probe this network anymore.
Partridge and Allman [20] propose to assess whether the
collection of data can induce harm on individuals and whether
the collected data reveals private information. By reducing the
intrusiveness as discussed above we believe that no individual
was harmed as a result of our active measurements. Further-
more, in order to protect private information we only release
IPv6 hitlists generated from publicly available data on our
website [11] and apply best practices [3].
IV. DATA SOURCES AND EXPERIMENT
In this section we first describe the data sources that
were used during the experiment. Then we give details about
the capturing and preprocessing steps. Finally, we present
evaluation results of the conducted experiments.
A. Passive Sources
We obtained passive flow data from two collectors: A large
European Internet Exchange Point (IXP) and the Internet
uplink of the Munich Scientific Network (MWN) operated by
the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre.
At the IXP, we obtained flow data at a sampling rate of
1:10,000 (systematic count-based sampling on packets). At
the MWN, we received flow data for all packets. At each
source we aggregated data into two sets, (a) from July 28
to August 10, 2015 and (b) from September 3 to September
16, 2015. The flows were filtered and then fed to a scanning
engine at each source to repeatedly scan the observed IP
addresses after specific time intervals (see Tables VI and
VII). Detailed statistics are given in Table I: While the IXP
observed a total of 146M unique addresses, the MWN network
saw 2.7M unique addresses. The MWN network starts with
a much higher count of IP address observations, but those
quickly melt when made unique. Furthermore, more than
two thirds of the observed addresses at MWN were filtered
out as they were stemming from the IANA-special domain.
This allows for two conclusions: First, uplink vantage points
are less diversified in communication to unique IP addresses
when compared to IXPs. Second, various tunneling techniques
(subset of IANA reserved IPs) heavily distort the number of
IP addresses observed at an uplink, but not at an IXP.
Figure 1 shows that the percentage of new IPs is close to
linear for the IXP as well as the MWN. This hints at the usage
of privacy extensions which will be evaluated in-depth later.
After a couple of days we already have seen addresses from
more than 90% of all observed ASes and prefixes. The dips
in the right subfigure are weekend days and a result of the
reduced presence and activity of researchers and students.
When looking at a port and protocol breakdown of the
TABLE II: Top 10 port-protocol combinations for IXP and MWN (based on count of flows).
Rank Jul 28, Jul 28 to Aug 10, Sep 03 to Sep 16, Jul 28, Jul 28 to Aug 10, Sep 03 to Sep 16,
2015 (IXP) 2015 (IXP) 2015 (IXP) 2015 (MWN) 2015 (MWN) 2015 (MWN)
1 tcp443 (31.65%) tcp443 (31.42%) tcp443 (34.31%) tcp443 (20.05%) tcp443 (20.91%) tcp443 (19.84%)
2 tcp80 (13.10%) tcp80 (13.88%) tcp80 (10.64%) udp53 (13.59%) udp53 (12.10%) udp53 (12.21%)
3 udp53 (1.26%) udp53 (1.17%) udp53 (1.19%) tcp80 (9.49%) tcp80 (9.40%) tcp80 (10.74%)
4 tcp119 (0.47%) tcp119 (0.52%) udp443 (0.74%) icmp6 (3.03%) icmp6 (3.42%) icmp6 (1.68%)
5 udp443 (0.45%) udp443 (0.43%) icmp6 (0.38%) udp443 (1.50%) udp443 (1.53%) udp443 (1.37%)
6 icmp6 (0.38%) icmp6 (0.35%) udp10000 (0.27%) tcp5228 (0.94%) tcp5228 (1.08%) tcp5228 (0.92%)
7 udp10000 (0.36%) udp10000 (0.32%) tcp25 (0.25%) tcp993 (0.74%) tcp993 (0.75%) tcp993 (0.64%)
8 tcp25 (0.24%) tcp25 (0.17%) tcp119 (0.23%) udp123 (0.27%) udp123 (0.36%) udp123 (0.40%)
9 tcp22 (0.15%) tcp993 (0.13%) tcp993 (0.14%) tcp25 (0.13%) udp51413 (0.15%) tcp53 (0.15%)
10 tcp993 (0.14%) tcp22 (0.12%) tcp22 (0.10%) tcp143 (0.11%) tcp25 (0.15%) udp51413 (0.14%)
TABLE III: AS2 and prefix2 statistics for IXP and MWN.
Characteristic IXP MWN
File size 5.3GB 93MB
Input lines 147M 2.7M
Targets 146,722,097 2,687,679
ASes 6,783 7,398
Announced prefixes 12,858 15,478
AS coverage 66.61% 72.65%
ASes unique to source 821 1,436
Normalized ASes 3,802 4,417
Prefix coverage 49.87% 60.04%
Prefixes unique to source 2,076 4,696
Normalized prefixes 7,467 10,087
Combined AS coverage 8,219 (80.71%)
Combined prefix coverage 25,781 (68.09%)
ICMP response rate1 ≈ 13% 31%
1: Only referring to last two out of four weeks of observation at each source.
Address considered responsive if a reply was received for any scan in the intervals
shown in Tables VII and VI.
2: As found in the CAIDA prefix to AS mapping of Sep 07, 2015 [4].
observed flows, several characteristics stand out (c.f. Table II):
First, the majority of flows stems from user-generated traffic
(tcp80, tcp443), with tcp443 showing clear dominance over
tcp80 and further increasing over time. Second, udp443, likely
traffic caused by Google’s QUIC protocol [25], sees a relevant
and increasing share during the observation period. As a
difference between the sources, a significantly higher share
of DNS flows at MWN stands out. This is to be expected, as
all up- and downstream recursive DNS is processed through
this link, whereas most DNS requests at an IXP are likely
routed through the peers’ regular Internet uplinks.
Table III compares the covered ASes and prefixes of the two
passive sources. Even though we see magnitudes more IPs at
the IXP, the coverage of ASes as well as prefixes is larger for
the MWN source. Moreover, the response rate to ICMP echo
requests is much higher at the MWN than the IXP.
B. Active Sources
As an active source we used the Alexa Top 1 Million list
[2] where we queried the domain names for AAAA DNS
records. Another source is a complete reverse lookup of
the entire IPv4 address space provided by Rapid7 [24]. We
extracted the hostnames from this list and recursively queried
those for AAAA records. Additionally Rapid7 offers the DNS
ANY Record file [23]. It contains replies from large-scale
DNS ANY scans, which we subsequently filtered for IPv6
addresses. Another data set are zone files for several top level
domains [22] which we resolved for their AAAA records.
All DNS queries were sent from a server at our chair. We
also used the CAIDA DNS names data set [5] containing
IPv6 addresses obtained by traceroutes to random targets. All
sources except the CAIDA DNS names data set are compared
in Table IV. All active sources hitlists are available on our
website [11].
Regarding ASes and prefixes we first look at the coverage,
i.e. the percentage of ASes and prefixes covered in each source
compared to all announced ASes and prefixes. Furthermore,
we identify ASes and prefixes which are uniquely covered
in only one source. In addition we provide another metric,
the normalized ASes and prefixes: We assign a weight to
each AS or prefix, which is defined as the inverse of the
number of sources it is contained in. We then sum up the
weights for all ASes and prefixes per source. Finally, we also
provide response rates for the various scan types and give
a combined coverage of ASes and prefixes. One takeaway
from the comparison is that the rDNS source provides little
added value given the effort to resolve and then parse more
than one billion host names to gain just 30 unique ASes.
Furthermore, the response rate of the found hosts is generally
high. Surprisingly ICMPv6 gives the most replies, even for
the Alexa list which should exclusively contain web servers
responsive on port tcp80.
C. Traceroutes to Target Lists
We also set out to answer how many more addresses can be
discovered by conducting traceroute measurements to known
existent addresses. Using scamper [18], we conducted path
measurements from hosts in Munich, Singapore and Dallas.
From every source, we probed all addresses learned from
active sources. These yielded more addresses from interme-
diate routers, depicted in Table V. This table also provides a
comparison of the new addresses learned from our traceroutes
TABLE IV: Analysis of active sources.
Alexa Top 1M rDNS DNS Any Zone Files
File size 22MB 56GB 69GB 2.6GB
Input lines 1M (100%) 1.2G (100%) 1.4G (100%) 151M (100%)
Raw addresses 90,671 (9.07%) 1,023,950 (0.08%) 9,768,810 (0.68%) 4,762,297 (3.14%)
Targets 43,822 (4.38%) 462,185 (0.04%) 1,440,987 (0.10%) 424,748 (0.28%)
ASes 1,424 4,795 5,708 2,371
Prefixes 1,695 6,749 8,506 2,995
AS coverage1 14.0% 47.1% 56.1% 23.3%
ASes unique to source 1 30 685 5
Normalized ASes 401.3 1,919.5 2,694.8 734.3
Prefix coverage1 6.57% 26.2% 33.0% 11.62%
Prefixes unique to source 7 65 1,379 11
Normalized prefixes 490.7 2,816.7 4,338.8 955.8
ICMPv6 response rate 41,759 (95.3%) 317,773 (68.8%) 1,046,562 (72.6%) 385,023 (90.6%)
tcp80 response rate 41,279 (94.2%) 131,403 (28.4%) 744,100 (51.6%) 375,052 (88.3%)
tcp443 response rate 33,225 (75.8%) 98,174 (21.2%) 400,182 (27.8%) 249,112 (58.6%)
Combined AS coverage 7,331 (71.9%)
Combined prefix coverage 12,854 (49.8%)
1: Compared to the CAIDA prefix to AS mapping of Sep 07, 2015 [4].
TABLE V: Analysis of new IPs found through traceroute measurements.
Acquired from traceroutes on active sources Self-standing source Merged
Alexa Top 1M rDNS DNS Any Zone Files CAIDA DNS-Names Merged CAIDA DNS-Names Merged
Raw IPs 155,046 9,681,039 28,260,818 14,249,257 315,123 n/a 1,236,960 n/a
Filtered IPs1 50,479 366,183 1,161,900 416,843 90,848 1,259,283 102,580 183,067
New IPs only 8,742 49,549 91,445 26,870 11,714 109,554 102,5802 183,067
ASes 1,216 3,354 3,928 2,012 1,014 4,170 5,488 6,287
Prefixes 1,439 4,178 5,007 2,498 1,176 5,367 9,269 10,466
AS coverage3 11.9 % 32.9 % 38.6 % 19.7 % 10.0 % 41.0 % 53.9 % 61.7 %
Prefix coverage3 5.6 % 16.2 % 19.4 % 9.7 % 4.6 % 20.8 % 36.0 % 40.6 %
1: Following the filtering cascade described in section III. 2: Assuming CAIDA data set includes routers only and not the original target IPs.
3: Compared to the CAIDA prefix to AS mapping of Sep 07, 2015 [4].
to those learned from CAIDA’s traceroutes. One quickly sees
that CAIDA’s approach of probing random IP addresses in
all announced prefixes yields a great AS and prefix coverage
that exceeds even those from all our measurements combined.
However, tracerouting adds another 80,487 (78%) router IP
addresses and 7.8% on AS coverage when compared to only
using the CAIDA DNS-Name data set.
D. Source Diversity
We understand that measurement results heavily depend on
the input data. Therefore we survey the diversity of our active,
passive and traceroute sources to ascertain their diversity.
The passive sources’ flow data are obtained at specific
locations: The MWN source is located in Munich, Germany.
However, it includes heterogeneous traffic from multiple uni-
versities, research institutes and end-users in the form of
student dormitories. The IXP source on the other side stems
from a large European IXP. This IXP’s customers include stub
ASes, transit ASes as well as ISP ASes offering end customer
access. As a result our passive sources provide a heterogeneous
mix of European-centered traffic.
Our active sources are the Alexa Top 1 Million list, rDNS,
ANY DNS, CAIDA DNS names, and DNS zone files. Due to
their inherent geographic distribution the first four sources can
be seen as substantially diverse. The addresses they contain are
not limited to any one specific network or parts of the Internet,
but represent the most common addresses. The DNS zone files,
however, are limited to the zones contained in this source.
This might introduce a slight bias towards addresses in North
America as major European country top level domains (TLDs)
such as .de, .co.uk, .fr, and .it are missing. Since the
organizations administrating these TLDs do not release their
zone files we have to take note of this slight bias.
From tracerouting we receive additional router addresses.
These addresses are located in 4,170 ASes and 103 countries,
which we consider a good coverage for a router only data set.
We conclude that the mix of obtained addresses is hetero-
geneous and representative for IPv6 traffic in the Internet.
V. EVALUATION
In this chapter we evaluate our sources along different
criteria: First, we assess the response rate of IPv6 addresses
over time. Second, we survey MAC addresses encoded in
interface IDs and the usage of privacy extensions. Then we
provide insights into the number of IP addresses as a metric
for IPv6 hitlists. Finally, we give concrete advise on which
source to use for hitlist generation depending on the scan type.
A. Response Rates over Time
At the passive sources, we performed active scans towards
each observed IP address both using ICMP and the protocol it
TABLE VI: MWN response rates over time after first address observation.
Scan Type # Targets 1 minute 10 minutes 1 hour 12 hours 1 day 3 days 7 days
icmp6 828,142 358,771 (43.32%) 349,030 (42.14%) 331,795 (40.06%) 296,657 (35.82%) 288,637 (34.85%) 282,622 (34.12%) 276,864 (33.43%)
tcp80 82,015 78,280 (95.44%) 78,268 (95.43%) 78,307 (95.47%) 78,187 (95.33%) 78,024 (95.13%) 78,027 (95.13%) 77,456 (94.44%)
tcp443 82,015 59,151 (72.12%) 59,126 (72.09%) 59,121 (72.08%) 59,071 (72.02%) 58,841 (71.74%) 58,894 (71.80%) 58,256 (71.03%)
udp443 5,292 3,211 (60.67%) 3,218 (60.80%) 3,228 (60.99%) 3,218 (60.80%) 3,210 (60.65%) 3,226 (60.95%) 3,161 (59.73%)
udp49001 7,314 3,748 (51.24%) 3,462 (47.33%) 2,698 (36.88%) 860 (11.75%) 778 (10.63%) 602 (8.23%) 547 (7.47%)
udp51413 12,875 5,488 (42.62%) 5,359 (41.62%) 5,035 (39.10%) 4,356 (33.83%) 4,242 (32.94%) 4,018 (31.20%) 3,852 (29.91%)
TABLE VII: IXP response rates after first address observation.
Scan Type # Targets 1 minute 1 hour 1 day 7 days
icmp6 66,079,853 8,780,586 (13.28%) 2,691,658 (4.07%) 905,833 (1.37%) 622,412 (.94%)
tcp80 392,913 276,964 (70.48%) 263,088 (66.95%) 243,693 (62.02%) 236,122 (60.09%)
udp443 2,839 2,317 (81.61%) 1,876 (66.07%) 1,806 (63.61%) 1,584 (55.79%)
udp49001 25,145 14,500 (57.66%) 7,893 (31.38%) 1,216 (4.83%) 559 (2.22%)
udp51413 32,732 4,125 (12.60%) 2,979 (9.10%) 1,751 (5.34%) 1,392 (4.25%)
TABLE VIII: In-protocol vs. ICMPv6 response rates.
IXP MWN
Scan Type Replies1 ICMP unresponsive Replies1 ICMP unresponsive
icmp6 8,710,139 n/a 257,563 n/a
tcp80 180,577 2,387 (1.32%) 54,010 937 (1.73%)
tcp443 n/a n/a 40,439 1,108 (2.74%)
udp443 2,192 81 (3.70%) 2,945 0 (0.00%)
udp49001 14,343 10,361 (72.2%) 3,709 2,391 (64.5%)
udp51413 3,514 274 (7.80%) 4,580 83 (1.81%)
1: Unique IPs which responded to in-protocol measurement.
was seen on. Those were repeated at certain intervals. At the
larger IXP source, we spared some time and protocol slots to
fit our bandwidth limits.
The Tables VI and VII and Figure 3 show the response rates
over time for MWN and IXP. The IPs learned at MWN show
a more time-stable behavior. Server-type ports (tcp80, tcp443,
udp443) show a very high and stable response rate. BitTorrent
(udp49001) shows a strong decrease after an initially high
response rate, while Mainline DHT (udp51413) has a more
stable response rate. Passive sources might include spoofed
addresses resulting in a lower response rate. Furthermore,
ICMPv6 is quite stable at MWN, whereas with a lower
response rate at the IXP. One possible explanation is rate
limiting of ICMPv6 packets at routers in target networks due to
the two magnitudes higher packet volume at the IXP compared
to MWN. In addition to observed ports all hosts were queried
for ICMPv6.
Table VIII compares response rates between in-protocol
scans (i.e., an observed host is scanned on the port and
protocol of the observation) and a generic ICMPv6 Echo
Request scan. The results very clearly show that generally
almost all hosts that reply in-protocol will also reply to ICMP
echo requests. One remarkable exception is udp49001, where
over 60% of hosts did not reply to echo requests. This is likely
due to udp49001 being a BitTorrent port and the associated
hosts may be behind home routers, blocking ICMP.
B. Interface Identifier Analysis
To better understand the acquired addresses we analyze the
interface identifier (IID) of these addresses, i.e. the last 64 bit.
TABLE IX: Top 5 vendors for EUI-64 IPs.
IXP Scamper
Position Vendor Percentage Vendor Percentage
1 Samsung 30.7% Arcadyan 28.4%
2 Apple 11.6% Huawei 24.4%
3 Sony 5.8% AVM 16.0%
4 Murata 5.1% Sercomm 10.5%
5 Huawei 5.1% Cisco 4.4%
Modified EUI-64 ID. IPv6 has a mechanism to automatically
assign addresses without a DHCPv6 server. This Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration mechanism usually takes an inter-
face’s MAC address and modifies it by inserting ff:fe in
the middle and flipping the 6th bit (RFC 4291). This modified
EUI-64 ID is then appended to the announced prefix.
In total we found about 2.5M EUI-64 IPs. IPs from the
active sources (8.6%) and Scamper (7.0%) are more likely to
be EUI-64 IPs than MWN (3.9%), IXP (1.6%) and CAIDA
(1.4%), likely due to multiple counts of clients using privacy
extensions at passive sources.
We aggregated the EUI-64 IDs by MAC vendors. Table IX
shows the top 5 vendors for the IXP and Scamper sources.
Not surprisingly, the IXP’s EUI-64 addresses are mainly from
user devices while the top 5 Scamper EUI-64 vendors are
networking equipment manufacturers. MWN and IXP as well
as Scamper and CAIDA show similar distributions.
Privacy Extensions. To avoid unique traceability through
MAC addresses encoded within the IID, RFC 4941 presents
Privacy Extensions. These reduce traceability by randomizing
the IID. Since the 6th bit (leftmost bit is 0) of the IID is always
set to 0 indicating local scope, 63 uniformly distributed bits
remain for the IID. By applying the central limit theorem, the
sum of these single bit distributions approximates the normal
distribution N (31.5, 15.75). Figure 2 shows the Hamming
weight distribution for the IXP and Scamper sources.
The Hamming weight distribution at the IXP approximates the
aforementioned normal distribution. This clearly indicates that
the vast majority of the IXP’s addresses contain a random IID.
A similar phenomenon was observed for the MWN source.
Addresses obtained from Scamper on the other hand differ
drastically: Two thirds of IIDs have less than six bits set to
one, with more than 40% only having one bit set. This hints at
a large number of statically assigned addresses which seems
reasonable for a source primarily consisting of routers.
Prefix Agility. The movement of IIDs between prefixes is
called prefix agility. To measure prefix agility, we evaluate the
number of IIDs which were seen in more than one /64 prefix.
IIDs from passive sources are relatively agile with ≈50%
appearing in 2 or more prefixes. These findings are different
to Plonka and Berger’s [21] who find ≈12% of modified
EUI-64 IIDs being agile. For active sources and Scamper, we
found only about 2% of IIDs to be agile. CAIDA showed a
surprisingly high agility of 14%, likely due to routers multi-
homing in multiple /64s.
We acknowledge that IID analysis could be influenced by
chance or willful action of a network administrator. However,
we consider this effect minor for large-scale analysis.
C. The Value of IPs as a Metric
Some insights throughout this paper show that a simple
count of IP addresses is not valuable: First, privacy extensions
dominate the observations at both passive sources and keep
the IP count growing almost linearly, while the number of
Autonomous Systems and prefixes found quickly saturates.
Second, few IPs form a stable core and are frequented by
many clients: the flow statistics show that 40-45% of flows
are observed on tcp443 or tcp80. As these flows typically
have a high (≥1024) port number on the other end, one can
derive that almost all traffic (80-90%) is to or from a set of
HTTP and HTTPS servers. However, Tables VI, VII and VIII
show that only ≈12% (MWN), respectively ≈0.6% (IXP) of
targets are associated to server ports, which will likely be more
responsive throughout time. Third, this stable core covers a
significant part of ASes and prefixes: Table X shows the AS
coverage by servers only. We find that servers cover ≈30-
50% of prefixes and ≈50-70% of ASes. This is due to an AS
announcing several prefixes. Covering one of these prefixes
already results in counting the AS.
D. Specific Approaches Depending on Scan Type
In this paper we present many different sources to create a
hitlist for IPv6 measurements, aggregated in Table XI. How-
ever, the value and usefulness of each of these sources depends
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Fig. 2: Hamming weight distribution of interface ID.
TABLE X: AS and prefix coverage by servers.
IXP MWN
Scan Type Servers Total Servers Total
ASes 4,452 (65%) 6,783 3,909 (53%) 7,398
Prefixes 6,736 (52%) 12,858 5514 (35%) 15478
TABLE XI: Statistics of active, passive, and traceroute sources.
Characteristic Active sources Passive sources Traceroutes CAIDA [5]
File size 75MB 5.4GB 2.4MB 40MB
Unique input lines 2.7M 149M 1.3M 618k
Unique targets 2,699,573 148,631,234 109,554 102,580
Unique ASes 5,750 8,219 4,170 5,488
Unique announced prefixes 8,602 17,554 5,367 9,269
AS coverage 56.46% 80.71% 41.00% 53.90%
ASes unique to source 128 1,276 14 147
Normalized ASes 1,918.33 3,684.67 1,158.83 1,873.17
Prefix coverage 33.37% 68.09% 20.76% 36.00%
Prefixes unique to source 346 5,798 53 514
Normalized prefixes 3,199.25 10,302.58 1,569.92 3,681.25
ICMPv6 response rate 75.5% 13.3% n/a 42.0%
Combined unique IPs 149,619,624
Combined AS coverage 8,531 (83.77%)
Combined prefix coverage 18,502 (71.77%)
on the research question to be answered and consequently the
type of scan to be carried out. Moreover, not all of these
sources might be available to every researcher. In addition,
the effort in terms of data storage, processing power and
network bandwidth should not be underestimated. Therefore
we dedicate this section to recommend the most efficient
combination of sources tailored specifically to the type of scan
in question.
Internet structure: Evaluating the Internet structure aims at
finding as many routers and transit links as possible. Therefore,
it is of essence to maximize the count of ASes and announced
prefixes in the hitlist (in contrast to maximizing IP count).
Table XI shows that a combination of passive sources and
the CAIDA DNS dataset [5] yields very high AS and prefix
coverage at low effort. Prefixes missing from that combination
could be probed using guessed IIDs (e.g. ::1).
Assessing security posture: Empirically assessing the Inter-
net’s security posture aims at scanning as many responsive
hosts as possible, although frequently only servers are of
interest. We recommend to start with active sources, quickly
providing 2.7M unique targets which are likely servers and
75% responsive. To further extend coverage, passive sources
could be leveraged. We conducted a more specific evaluation
for web servers (tcp80, tcp443 and udp443) in Table XII. It
shows that when looking for web server IP addresses, active
sources provide the bulk mass of unique addresses. However,
passive sources, if available, are still a reasonable addition in
terms of addresses, prefixes and ASes covered.
Internet routers: When aiming to scan Internet routers, we
advise to use CAIDA’s IPv6 DNS dataset as the first source.
As seen in Table V it provides very good coverage with very
low effort. When aiming for maximum coverage, traceroutes to
other active sources will incrementally add more IP addresses.
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Fig. 3: Response rate related to observed addresses (top row) and responsive addresses (bottom row).
Note: icmp6 rate related to all addresses, port/protocol rate related to addresses observed on port/protocol.
TABLE XII: Web Server statistics.
IXP1 MWN1 Alexa Zone Files
Unique filtered addresses 256,891 56,846 43,822 752,585
IPs unique to source 86,996 5,573 4,180 416,477
ASes unique to source 325 59 101 784
Prefixes unique to source 650 111 144 1,100
1: Addresses observed on ports tcp80, tcp443 or udp443.
Clients: When analyzing clients, a passive tap is a good way
to gather active addresses (see Tables VII and VI). However,
these quickly vanish, so almost immediate scans are advisable.
Active prefixes: Passive sources are key to identifying active
prefixes and their subprefixes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We leveraged both passive and active measurements to
gather 150M IPv6 addresses covering 84% of ASes and 72%
of prefixes. We actively probed these addresses to evaluate the
response rate. We found very diverse characteristics of sources
with regards to coverage and efficiency. We derived specific
recommendations which source to use for different scan types.
Additionally, we argue that the sole number of IPv6 addresses
on a hitlist is not very relevant and can be vastly misleading.
Therefore, we suggest to build a hit list focused on stable IP
addresses covering a diverse set of ASes and prefixes.
Future Work. To further tailor the hit list to a specific scan
type a classification of hosts (e.g. server, router, client) could
help. Moreover, one could try to derive patterns from stable
IP addresses to predict responsive addresses in other subnets.
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